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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JULIE HARMON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920463-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Supp.) provides 
this Court's jurisdiction over this non-capital, non-first degree 
felony criminal conviction from the district court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the State meet its burden to show that a reasonable 
hypothetical officer would have arrested Julie Harmon for driving on 
a suspended driver's license in the absence of Detective Russo's 
unconstitutional motivation to investigate Ms. Harmon for illegal 
drugs? 
2. Did the State meet its burden to show that Ms. Harmon's 
consent to the search of her home was voluntary and purged of the 
taint of her illegal arrest? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress, this Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact 
under the "clearly erroneous" standard, and reviews legal 
conclusions without deference for correctness. E.g. State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-782 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appendix 1 to this brief contains the full text of the 
following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
Utah Code Ann. section 41-2-136 (1992 Cum. Supp.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-2 (1990 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-18 (1992 Cum. Supp.). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Julie Harmon with three counts of 
possession of a controlled substance, two third degree felony 
counts, and one class B misdemeanor (R. 6-8). The magistrate bound 
over one felony and one misdemeanor count relating to drugs found in 
Ms. Harmon's home (R. 3). The count dismissed involved what 
appeared to be prescription drugs in Ms. Harmon's purse (R. 3). 
Ms. Harmon moved to suppress all of the State's evidence, 
asserting her rights under Article I section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (R. 23-24, 30-74). The trial court denied this motion 
(R# 79-91). Copies of the trial court's memorandum decision, and 
findings and conclusions are in appendix 2. 
Following the trial court's denial of her motion to 
suppress, Ms. Harmon entered a conditional Sery plea to one third 
degree felony count of possession of a controlled substance, 
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explicitly reserving the right to appeal the trial court's denial of 
her suppression motion (R. 95-101). The trial court sentenced Ms. 
Harmon to a zero to five year prison sentence and fined her $1,000 
plus a 25% surcharge (R, 110). The court suspended the prison 
sentence, placing Ms. Harmon on probation (R. Ill). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Detective Robbie Russo, Deputy for the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff of almost eight years, was working in the Metro Narcotics 
Strike Force on November 19, 1991. The purpose of the strike force 
is enforcement of drug laws. He went to Ms. Harmon's address, 2904 
South 9100 West, because an informant had accused a Julie Harmon, 
living at that address, of dealing in narcotics. Russo refused to 
identify the informant or elaborate on the details of their 
relationship. Russo's purpose in going to her home was to search 
the home for drugs. The confidential informant had performed no 
controlled buys from Ms. Harmon. Russo went to Ms. Harmon's home in 
the early evening hours, just as she was pulling out of her driveway 
in her car. When she saw him drive up in his unmarked car, she 
stopped her car and he approached her and identified himself as a 
police officer. He told her that she was suspected of dealing in 
narcotics — that it was rumored that she was a cocaine drug lord 
and had all the drugs in Columbia in her house. She denied the 
allegations. He requested her consent to search her home, and she 
told him that he would have to wait until she returned from visiting 
her father, who had had recently had a heart attack and was 
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returning from the hospital that day. He told her that he did not 
have a search warrant, and would prefer to search her home before 
she left to see her father. Again, she told him he would have to 
wait until she returned. It was clear that she would not allow him 
to search at that time. During the conversation in her driveway, 
Russo told her he would have to get a search warrant. He never told 
her what he admitted to at trial, that he did not have enough 
evidence to obtain a search warrant. R. 200-203, 219-221, 227-229. 
Russo indicated that Ms. Harmon drove around the block a 
couple of times within five minutes, and testified that he could 
tell that she was concerned that he was at her home. He ran a 
warrants and driver's license check on her through dispatch. He 
then discovered that her driver's license was suspended, and called 
for back-up. He decided to arrest her for driving on suspension, 
prior to stopping her.1 He followed her with another police car 
containing two uniformed officers behind him, and she stopped two 
blocks away from her home in a lot off the side of the road, across 
the street from another officer in a separate car. Russo confronted 
Ms. Harmon about her driving on suspension, and she explained again 
that she had needed to go see her father. He placed her under 
arrest for driving on suspension. She began to cry and told him 
1. In the trial court, it was repeatedly stated that 
driving on suspension is a class B misdemeanor. E.g. R. 90. While 
there are class B misdemeanor driving on suspensions, it appears 
that under Utah Code Ann. section 41-2-136, Ms. Harmon was guilty of 
a class C misdemeanor driving on suspension. Ms. Harmon testified 
that her license was suspended when a friend was stopped while 
driving one of Ms. Harmon's uninsured vehicles (R. 285). 
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that he could not search her home, but would have to get a warrant. 
R. 203-205, 232, 235, 246. 
Upon arresting Ms. Harmon, Russo conducted what he called a 
"search and seizure arrest.11 R. 206. He placed her in handcuffs, 
placed her in his car, and looked through her purse and vehicle and 
found vials of prescription drugs, one of which vials bore her name, 
another of which vials had the label scratched off. He indicated 
that she had committed an offense involving the possession of 
prescription drugs without the proper container, and indicated that 
she also admitted that the pills were her mother7s or someone 
else's. He took the pills and the money from her purse. Russo 
placed her in his vehicle and informed her of her Miranda rights, 
and the backup officer proceeded to impound her car. R. 206-207, 
233-234. 
After he purportedly arrested her for the suspended license 
and gave her her Miranda warnings, he told her that he knew she had 
drugs in her home. Russo testified that five minutes into their 
journey on the way to the jail, Ms. Harmon told Russo that she was 
afraid to let him search her home because she used to deal drugs, 
and did not want him to find any residue of this past activity. She 
told him that she was concerned about her father, and may have told 
him that she could not bail out of jail because Russo had 
confiscated the money from her purse. He testified that she then 
told him that she wished to reform her lifestyle, and would allow 
him to search her home. He testified that it would be improper for 
him to go search her home, because he had already placed her under 
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arrest and did not wish to appear to be coercing her consent to the 
search by having arrested her. He testified that she told him there 
would be no problem, and that she said that she would sign 
anything. It was clear to Russo that Ms. Harmon did not want to go 
to jail and was upset at the prospect of having to do so. He 
testified that he told her he would just proceed to get a warrant, 
but that she mentioned the names of other Metro Narcotics detectives 
and convinced him that a warrant was unnecessary. During the car 
ride, Russo mentioned having to get a warrant for the second time, 
despite his knowledge that he had insufficient probable cause for a 
warrant. He never told Ms. Harmon that he could not obtain a 
warrant. He testified that he was making her no promises and that 
the search did not guarantee her release from custody. At 
approximately this point in the conversation, after they had driven 
70 or 90 blocks, Detective Russo turned his car around to return to 
her home. He said that on the way back to her house, they discussed 
the details of her prior drug deals. He admitted that he told Ms. 
Harmon on the way to the jail that he knew she had drugs, and he 
admitted to having warned Ms. Harmon on the way to the jail that it 
would be an unpleasant experience for her if he had to get a 
warrant. R. 207-210, 236-237, 249-251. 
When they arrived at her house, Russo called for back-up, 
repeated the Miranda warning, and gave her the consent form, which 
she signed. R. 211. A copy of the consent form is in evidence 
(State's Exhibit 1), and in Appendix 3 to this brief. The form 
states, in relevant part, 
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I, Julie Harmon, having been informed of my 
rights per Miranda not to have a search made of 
the premises, hereinafter mentioned, without a 
Search Warrant, of my right to refuse to consent 
to a search, hereby authorize; Det R Russo police 
officer and his agent of the Metropolitan 
Narcotics Strike Force to conduct a complete 
search of my person, premise(s) and/or vehicle 
at; 2904 S. 9100 W. These officers are 
authorized by me to search and seize any 
contraband or fruits of any crime while 
conducting a search on a narcotics investigation. 
This written permission is being given to me 
to the above mentioned police officer voluntarily 
and without threats or promises of any kind. 
The majority of the blanks in the form were filled out by Russo. R. 
241. 
The police approached her home, and had her secure her dog 
so they would not have to shoot it in executing the search. She put 
her dog in the back yard and proceeded to show Russo where her drugs 
and paraphernalia were. The detectives also found some on their 
own. During the course of the search, she called her brother, a 
deputy sheriff, who also spoke with Russo. Detective Brenneman 
testified that her demeanor during the search was friendly and 
cordial. R. 212-214, 253, 258. 
At the conclusion of the search, Russo did not take Ms. 
Harmon back to jail for driving on suspension or possession, but 
elected to leave Ms. Harmon at home, with the understanding that she 
would call him in the morning to discuss her willingness to work off 
her charges doing under cover work. While he denied bargaining with 
her to trade her consent to the search for avoiding going to jail, 
he admitted that once she gave him the drugs he was looking for, she 
was not going to jail anymore. R. 214-215. 
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Julie Harmon testified that after she refused to consent to 
the search of her home# Russo told her he could get a warrant and 
refused to move so she could leave. She told him he could search 
after she returned from her parents', and that he then allowed her 
to leave* She testified that after she was stopped by the three 
police cars, and after Russo asked her about the suspended license, 
Russo requested her permission to search her car and then Russo 
asked her if she would let him search her house, and she said no. 
He then said, "Then, you are going to jail." She asked him if he 
would let her go if she consented to the search of her house, and he 
said he would. She testified that on the way to the jail, he told 
her he knew she had drugs in her house, and told her he would get a 
warrant and tear her house apart. She asked if she could use the 
$285 she had in her purse to bail out of jail, and he told her no. 
She was crying and worried about what the additional stress from her 
arrest would do to her father, and told Russo that he could have the 
drugs belonging to someone else that were in her home. She 
testified that she first heard Russo on his radio informing the jail 
that he was bringing in a female, and later heard him call the jail 
to cancel the first call, informing the jail, "She's changed her 
mind." She said that when they got to her house, he told her that 
he did not want to have to shoot her dog, and had her sign the 
consent form prior to going to secure her dog. She signed it 
without reading it first. She was cooperative during the search 
because her brother is a policeman and because Russo had warned her 
that they would rip her house apart. R. 277-290. 
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Russo never cited her for any traffic offense, nor did the 
State charge her with any traffic offense (R. 164). 
Russo testified that he had placed people under arrest for 
driving on suspension several dozen times "counting citations and 
custodial arrests," and then he clarified that he had performed 
custodial arrests for driving on suspension maybe a dozen times. He 
could not recall how many of those custodial arrests involved 
DUIs. R. 205-206, 233. 
Detective Sterner testified that in three years, he had 
arrested people for driving on suspension six or seven times, and 
had given simple citations twenty to thirty times. He indicated 
that three or four of the custodial arrests involved DUIs. It was 
his general practice to handle driving on suspension with a 
citation. R. 268-269. 
Detective Ben Anjewierden testified that at the time of Ms. 
Harmon's arrest, as a result of a consent decree relating to jail 
overcrowding, the jail's policy called for releasing without formal 
booking of those charged solely with driving on suspension. He 
indicated that the policy was not mandatory. R. 273, 276. The 
trial court would not allow defense counsel to make a record of 
whether Russo knew about the jail policy of releasing misdemeanants 
such as Ms. Harmon without booking them, finding that under State v. 
Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992), the officer's intent was not 
relevant. R. 244. 
The trial court found that the arrest for driving on 
suspension was within Detective Russo's discretion, explicitly 
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declining to consider Detective Russo's subjective intent, and 
without applying the reasonable hypothetical officer test. The 
court then found that Ms. Harmon's consent to the search of her home 
was voluntary. R. 104-108, 243-244. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Driving on suspension is normally handled by citation 
unless a DUI is involved. Nonetheless, when Detective Russo 
discovered Ms. Harmon's suspended driver's license, he decided to 
arrest the rumored "drug lord" who allegedly had "all of the drugs 
in Columbia" in her house. He did in fact then execute what he 
tellingly referred to as a "search and seizure arrest," finding what 
appeared to be illegal prescription drugs on Ms. Harmon's person, 
and later obtaining her consent to search her home where illegal 
drugs were found. Prior to obtaining her consent to search her 
home, Russo was driving Ms. Harmon to the jail, purportedly for 
driving on suspension. Yet during the drive to the jail, he 
informed her that he knew she had drugs and warned her that it would 
be unpleasant if he had to resort to a warrant. After Ms. Harmon 
consented to the search of her home, Russo did not take her to jail 
for driving on suspension or cite her for this offense, for which 
she was never charged, but left her at her home, instructing her to 
call him in the morning. 
In failing to address the officer's unconstitutional 
motivation and in failing to then apply the reasonable hypothetical 
officer test, the trial court misapplied the law. The illegal 
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arrest requires the exclusion of all derivative evidence. 
The major flaw in the trial court's consent analysis is her 
failure to recognize the illegal arrest, and then assess whether the 
State met its burden to show that the consent was not only 
voluntary, but also independent from the illegality preceding the 
consent. The State cannot meet this burden on the facts of this 
case, and reversal is necessary. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE STATE DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN 
TO SHOW THAT A REASONABLE HYPOTHETICAL OFFICER 
WOULD HAVE ARRESTED MS. HARMON ABSENT 
DETECTIVE RUSSO'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL MOTIVATION. 
In State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1990), the 
majority of this Court maintained and clarified the pretext 
doctrine.2 The trial court relied on Lopez during the hearing on 
2. In Lopez. the State conceded the validity of the pretext 
doctrine in the context of misdemeanor traffic arrests, stating, 
[T]he State's argument that this Court should abandon 
the pretext analysis adopted in Sierra is directed 
only at traffic stops and does not extend to 
misdemeanor traffic arrests. The State shares 
defendant's concern that a misdemeanor traffic arrest 
could be misused by a police officer as a pretext to 
conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested 
person and his or her vehicle without reasonable 
suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant. While an 
officer appears to have the authority to arrest for a 
misdemeanor traffic violation under Utah law, that 
clearly is not the usual practice. 
Reply brief of Appellee in State v. Lopez, Case No. 900484-CA, at 5 
(footnote omitted). 
Tellingly, in the trial court the prosecutor argued that 
traffic stops and arrests are valid tools for officers to use in 
investigating drug crimes and enforcing drug laws. T. 5/22/92 p. 57, 
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the motion to suppress, and cited and quoted Lopez in crafting her 
memorandum decision, from which the prosecutor drafted the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court's initial summary 
of Lopez in her memorandum decision is accurate but incomplete.3 
3. The trial court's memorandum decision, in Appendix 2, 
states, 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently clarified 
what constitutes a "pretext stop" in the state of 
Utah in State of Utah v. Lopez. P.2d (Utah 
App. Decided May 5, 1992). Lopez reiterates the 
well-established principal that under the Fourth 
Amendment, the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures extends to automobiles. 
Id.. at 3. "Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
police officers from randomly or arbitrarily 
stopping vehicles on the highway." Id. Lopez 
then describes three situations in which an 
officer is justified in stopping a vehicle 
without a warrant: 
(1) When the officer observes the driver 
commit a traffic violation; (2) When the 
officer has a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the driver is committing 
a traffic offense, such as driving under 
the influence of alcohol or driving 
without a license; and (3) When the 
officer has a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the driver is engaged in 
more serious criminal activity, such as 
transporting drugs. 
Id. at 4, [citations o[]mitted]. 
Lopez articulates that the "pretext 
doctrine" applies in two distinct situations. 
First, it applies where the facts demonstrate the 
driver did not commit a traffic violation. Under 
such circumstances, the stop would almost always 
be unconstitutional. This situation does not 
exist in this case because it is undisputed that 
a traffic violation was committed by Harmon. 
Lopez, supra, at 6, Fn.7. The second situation is 
[W]here the driver committed a minor 
traffic violation or the vehicle had a 
minor equipment problem, but where the 
court concludes that a reasonable 
(footnote continues) 
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What is missing from the trial court's summary of Lopez. 
and is also reflected in the trial court's ruling at the hearing ("I 
disagree with that especially in light of the State vs. Lopez case. 
The reasonable officer standard does not involve the intent of the 
officer." R. 243), is the role of the officer's subjective intent in 
the hypothetical reasonable officer test. Under Lopez, the 
officer's subjective intent is a fundamental part of the 
hypothetical reasonable officer test: the unconstitutional or 
illegal motivation. See e.g. Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1047 (fl[T]he issue 
of whether a traffic stop is a pretext stop cannot turn on the issue 
of an officer's subjective intent, but rather, must turn on the 
objective question of whether a reasonable officer would have made 
the stop absent the illegal motivation.")(emphasis added and 
deleted). 
Because the trial court misperceived that Detective Russo's 
subjective intent was not relevant at all, the trial court did not 
(footnote 3 continued) 
police officer [could have but] would 
not have stopped the vehicle absent the 
unconstitutional motivation. 
Id. at 6 [emphasis added]. 
Lopez goes on to explain that 
[t]he proper inquiry is whether a 
reasonable officer would have stopped 
the defendant solely for commission of 
the traffic offense. . . . The proper 
inquiry does not focus on whether the 
officer could validly have made the 
stop. . . . Further . . . the 
officer's subjective motivation is not 
the relevant inquiry. 
Id., at 9-10 [emphasis in original]. 
(R. 84-85). 
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recognize Russo's desire to investigate the "rumored drug lord" who 
had "all the drugs in Columbia" in her house, when he decided to 
arrest Ms. Harmon for a misdemeanor traffic offense and then 
conducted a "search and seizure arrest." Nor did the trial court 
apply the reasonable hypothetical officer test. Her memorandum 
ruling demonstrates how she resolved the legal issue, stating, 
The second issue raised by Harmon in 
relation to this stop is that it was not 
reasonable for Detective Russo to arrest her for 
this offense. As to this issue, Detective Russo 
had discretion whether to cite Harmon for this 
traffic violation or to arrest her. The 
testimony at the hearing was that officers in the 
field occasionally arrest persons driving on a 
suspended license, even if the driver does not 
appear to be intoxicated. They routinely 
exercise discretion as to whether they arrest the 
offender or merely issue a citation. This 
discretion exists in a multitude of situations in 
which an individual may be subject to arrest, 
bu[t] the officer decides not to take that 
action. This discretion, which is inherent in 
the work of the police officers, will not be 
disturbed in this case in light of all the 
circumstances. Moreover, it does not appear to 
this Court that Detective Russo abused this 
discretion. 
Thus, it appears to this Court that a 
reasonable officer would have stopped and 
arrested this defendant; and therefore, Detective 
Russo's actions were not based upon a pretextual 
scheme, but upon his legal authority to stop 
Harmon from committing a Class B misdemeanor: 
namely, driving with a suspended license. 
(R. 86-87). 
The trial court's findings of fact similarly make no 
mention of Russo's motivation to investigate Ms. Harmon's drug 
involvement, but indicate that "Detective Russo had stopped and 
arrested approximately 12 persons for driving on a suspended license 
within the past year. . . . Officers routinely ex[]ercise 
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discretion as to whether they arrest for Driving on Suspension or 
issue a citation." (R. 106). The conclusions of law echo this 
analysis, stating, "Police officers exercise discretion as to 
whether they arrest the offender or issue a citation. This 
discretion was not abused by Detective Russo when he arrested Harmon 
for Driving on Suspension." (R. 107). 
While the trial court was likely correct that the evidence 
before her demonstrated that a reasonable officer would have stopped 
Ms. Harmon for driving on suspension, neither the evidence nor the 
law support the conclusion that a reasonable hypothetical officer 
would have arrested Ms. Harmon for the offense, absent Russo's 
unconstitutional motivation to evade the warrant requirement. 
Detective Russo testified that he had placed people under 
arrest for driving on suspension several dozen times "counting 
citations and custodial arrests," and then he clarified that he had 
performed custodial arrests for driving on suspension in maybe a 
dozen times. He could not recall how many of those custodial 
arrests involved DUIs. R. 205-206, 233. Detective Sterner 
testified that in three years, he had arrested people for driving on 
suspension six or seven times, and had given simple citations twenty 
to thirty times. He indicated that three or four of the custodial 
arrests involved DUIs. It was his general practice to handle 
driving on suspension with a citation. R. 268-269. Detective 
Anjewierden testified that at the time of Ms. Harmon's arrest, as a 
result of a consent decree relating to jail overcrowding, the jail's 
policy called for releasing without formal booking of those charged 
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solely with driving on suspension. He indicated that the policy was 
not mandatory. R. 273, 276. 
The trial court ruled that under State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 
1040 (Utah App. 1992), Detective Russo's intent was not relevant, 
and refused trial counsel's efforts to make a record of Russo's 
knowledge of the jail's no-booking release policy. R. 244. 
However, the record demonstrates that Russo would not have arrested 
Ms. Harmon for driving on suspension absent his desire to 
investigate his drug suspicions. While Russo initially arrested Ms. 
Harmon for driving on suspension, once he got what he wanted (full 
search of her person, car and home without a warrant), he did not 
take her to jail, or even issue a citation for driving on suspension. 
As trial counsel argued to the trial court, the law does 
not permit a police officer to evade the warrant requirements of the 
State and Federal Constitutions by arresting traffic misdemeanants 
(R. 33, 152). In State v. Parker. 834 P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1992), 
the police wished to investigate Mr. Parker for a burglary. Upon 
witnessing Mr. Parker speeding twenty miles over the limit in a 
residential section into a driveway where he stopped, a police 
officer ordered Mr. Parker from his car at gunpoint, handcuffed him 
and arrested him. Id. at 593. Reasoning that "a traffic stop is a 
limited seizure and is more like an investigative dentention than a 
custodial arrest," this Court assessed the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness of the officer's conduct under the two pronged test 
of Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968): 
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(1) Was the officer's action justified at its 
inception?, and (2) Was his action reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place? 
Parker at 594. In Parker, as in the instant case, the officer's 
decision to stop the traffic misdemeanant was objectively 
reasonable. See id. at 594. However, the scope of the officers' 
conduct in both cases went far beyond the circumstances that 
justified the initial stop. In both cases, rather than issuing a 
traffic citation and allowing the drivers to proceed on their way 
(Ms. Harmon was approximately two blocks from her home, within easy 
walking distance), the officers arrested the drivers. See id. at 
594-95 and n.l (recognizing statutory discretion to arrest for 
misdemeanor traffic violations, but noting that for purposes of 
Fourth Amendment analysis, traffic stops must be accomplished 
through the least intrusive means). Just as the officer in Parker 
had no reasonable articulable suspicion to justify detaining Mr. 
Parker for the burglary, id. at 595, Detective Russo had no 
reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Ms. Harmon for suspicion 
of trafficking in drugs. Detective Russo's wholly unsubstantiated 
statement from a confidential informant that Julie Harmon was 
dealing illegal drugs does not meet the constitutional standard of a 
reasonable articulable suspicion, and certainly does not provide the 
probable cause required for her warrantless arrest. See e.g. State 
v. Svkes. 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah 1992)(discussing what does and 
does not constitute a reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking); 
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)(explaining probable cause for 
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arrest; holding that warrantless seizure and search of Mr. Beck, 
disclosing illegal clearinghouse slips, could not be justified as a 
valid search incident to arrest on basis of officer's testimony that 
the officer had a photograph of Mr. Beck and knew what he looked 
like, knew of his prior record for similar violations, and had 
received unspecified "information" and "reports" from unidentified 
sources); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 
L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)(officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Ms. 
White on the basis of an anonymous tip, the details of which 
accurately predicted her future behavior, indicating the anonymous 
informer's unique knowledge of Ms. White); Draper v. United States. 
358 U.S. 307 (1959)(probable cause to arrest justified by reliance 
on known informer who had proved reliable over a period of six 
months, when arresting officer received and personally verified 
numerous details provided by the informer). 
The trial court's ruling that Detective Russo's arrest of 
Ms. Harmon was within his discretion was incorrect. There is no 
evidence that at the time of Ms. Harmon's arrest, when there were 
three police cars and at least four police officers present, she 
posed any threat of violence or escape. Nor was there a reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause of drug trafficking to justify her 
arrest. Cf. Parker at 595 ("After witnessing Parker speed into his 
grandmother's driveway, Corporal Naylor pulled his vehicle behind 
Parker's unholstered his gun, removed Parker from his vehicle, 
handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest. There is no evidence 
that Parker was making any attempt at escape; to the contrary, the 
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vehicle was in neutral and pointed toward the garage. At this 
point, Corporal Naylor had no reasonable articulable suspicion that 
Parker had committed or was about to commit a crime. Under the 
circumstances present here, it is patently offensive to suggest that 
a police officer acting as Corporal Naylor did here was within the 
realm of discretion granted to police officers under the law."). 
See also State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah App. 
1992)("Allowing police officers to stop vehicles for any minor 
violation when the officer in fact is pursuing a hunch would allow 
officers to seize almost any individual on the basis of otherwise 
unconstitutional objectives. Such unfettered discretion offends the 
Fourth Amendment.")(citations omitted); United States v. Walker, 933 
F.2d 812, 816 n.l (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied. 112 S.Ct. 1168, 
117 L.Ed.2d 414 ("[I]t appears that Utah law does not allow an 
officer in these circumstances to make a custodial arrest for a 
speeding violation. See Utah Code Ann. §77-7-18 et seq."). 
In addition to reversing the trial court's ruling that the 
arrest was legal, this Court may wish to consider an independent 
ruling under Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution that the 
officer's subjective intent is a relevant consideration in the 
assessment of the reasonableness of an officer's conduct. Trial 
counsel's motions to suppress invoked Ms. Harmon's rights under 
Article I section 14 (R. 23-24, 31-32). Trial counsel argued in 
writing that the protections of Article I section 14 are broader 
than those of the fourth amendment, citing State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), and citing and attaching a copy of 
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K. Wallentine, "Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence 
Under the Utah Constitution, Article I section 14." (R. 33-64). At 
the hearing on the motion, trial counsel reiterated this history of 
the state and constitution, and argued specifically that under 
Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution, intent should be a 
relevant factor in this case (R. 145-150, 243). The trial court 
declined to rule on independent state constitutional grounds (R. 80, 
108) . 
The unique history of this state justifies broad protection 
of Article I section 14 rights. See R. 33-64. An additional basis 
for adopting the Utah Constitutional ruling sought by trial counsel 
is that federal law on the role of an officer's subjective intent in 
search and seizure cases is confusing. See State v. Larocco. 794 
P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990)(main opinion makes independent Utah 
constitutional law under Article I section 14 because search and 
seizure law has grown confusing and unworkable in the federal 
courts). 
The federal rule is that courts must assess the 
reasonableness of police conduct objectively. E.g. Scott v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978)("[A]lmost without exception in 
evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the Court has 
first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions in 
light of the facts and circumstances then known to him.").4 
4. It is arguable that the objectivity rule in Scott is 
dicta, see Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never 
Leaving," 66 U. Detroit L.Rev. 363, 366-368 (1989); Burkoff, "Bad 
(footnote continues) 
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Unfortunately, many courts, like the trial court in this 
case, misperceive that an "objective" assessment must exclude 
consideration of an officer's subjective intent. As the court 
explained in United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 
1988), such a misunderstanding of the objective test in pretext 
cases hinders the goal of limiting excessive police discretion. 
It is the need to restrain the arbitrary exercise 
of discretionary police power that has been the 
driving force behind the Court's decisions 
forbidding police practices not amenable to 
objective review. Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47, 
52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 
(1979)("When ... a stop is not based on objective 
criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive 
police practices exceeds tolerable limits."); 
Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648 661, 99 S.Ct. 
1391, 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)("[S]tandardless 
and unconstrained discretion is the evil the 
Court has discerned when in previous cases it has 
insisted that the discretion of the official in 
the field be circumscribed"). Determining the 
constitutionality of intrusions by the 
prosecution's ability to justify them under some 
set of objective circumstances would undermine 
the Court's concern with limiting unreviewable 
discretion in the name of the objective test 
designed to safeguard that concern. 
Id. at 1516. See also United States v. Keller. 499 F.Supp. 415, 417 
(footnote 4 continued) 
Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70, 83-84 (1982); Burkoff, "The 
Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 17 
U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523 (1984); and that the legal underpinnings of that 
dicta are wanting, see LaFave Search and Seizure, section 1.4, pages 
81-83; A. Eisemann Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223, 242-244 (1983); Burkoff, 
"Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70 (1982). 
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(N.D. 111. 1980)("If every arrest were judged by an objective 
standard and upheld if there was a valid basis for arrest, then 
there could never be a pretextual arrest. The concept assumes that 
there is a basis for an arrest, but that the arrest is made for the 
purpose of conducting a search for which there would not otherwise 
be a justification. Although proving subjective motives is 
unquestionably problematic, to judge an arrest by an objective 
standard ignores, instead of solves, the problem.")(citation 
omitted). 
Under Scott, the subjective intent of the officer is 
pertinent to evaluating the police officer's credibility, and in 
determining whether exclusion of evidence is an appropriate remedy. 
The Scott Court stated, 
This is not to say, of course, that the 
question of motive plays absolutely no part in 
the suppression inquiry. On occasion, the motive 
with which the officer conducts an illegal search 
may have some relevance in determining the 
propriety of applying the exclusionary rule. For 
example, in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 
458, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 96 S.Ct. 3021 (1976), we 
ruled that evidence unconstitutionally seized by 
state police could be introduced in federal civil 
tax proceedings because "the imposition of the 
exclusionary rule . . . is unlikely to provide 
significant, much less substantial, additional 
deterrence. It falls outside the offending 
officer'& zone of primary interest." See also 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 
276-277, 55 L.Ed.2d 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054 (1978). 
This focus on intent, however, becomes relevant 
only after it has been determined that the 
Constitution was in fact violated. We also have 
little doubt that as a practical matter the 
judge's assessment of the motives of the officers 
may occasionally influence his judgment regarding 
the credibility of the officers' claims with 
respect to what information was or was not 
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available to them at the time of the incident in 
question. But the assessment and use of motive 
in this limited manner is irrelevant to our 
analysis of the questions at issue in this case. 
436 U.S. 128, 139 n. 13. Several cases following Scott recognize 
that the subjective intent of police officers is a relevant factor 
to be considered. E.g. United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 
n.3 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Causev. 834 F.2d 1179, 1182 n. 
7 (5th Cir. 1987). 
The United States Supreme Court has been inconsistent in 
its application of the objectivity rule,5 and its application of a 
two-step violation/exclusion Fourth Amendment effectively defeats 
Fourth Amendment challenges and remedies.6 
5. For cases examining subjective intent, see e.g. Jones v. 
United States. 357 U.S. 493, 500 (1958); Abel v. United States, 362 
U.S. 217, 226, 230 (I960); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 
(1963); South Dakota v. Qpperman. 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976); Colorado 
v. Bannister. 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.4 (1980)(per curiam); Steagald v. 
United States. 451 U.S. 204, 215 (1981); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 
U.S. 287, 292 (1984)(plurality opinion); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 
U.S. 367, 371, 372 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison. 480 U.S. 79, 85, 87 
(1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729 (1987)(plurality 
opinion). See also Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 
70, 75-83 (1982); Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See 
It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523, 544-548 (1984); A. 
Eisemann Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223, 242-244 (1983). 
For cases citing the objectivity rule and ignoring the 
subjective intent, see e.g. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 
U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983); Maryland v. Macon. 472 U.S. 463, 471 
(1985). See also Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See 
It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523, 524-525, 528-532 (1984). 
6. For criticism of this two-step approach, see Burkoff, 
"The Court that Swallowed the Fourth Amendment," 58 Ore.L.Rev. 151, 
187-190 (1979). 
-23-
This Court should act under the Utah Constitution and 
vitalize the pretext doctrine by recognizing that the subjective 
intent of the officer is relevant, and may be proved by traditional 
objective evidence, or by the officer's direct testimony on his 
subjective intent. Such an approach would be consistent with State 
v, Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), wherein the court explicitly 
held that under the Utah Constitution, "exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of 
article I section 14." Id. at 472 (emphasis added). Under the 
federal Fourth Amendment Scott decision, the subjective intent of 
the officer is not entirely irrelevant, but is pertinent to 
determining whether exclusion of evidence is an appropriate remedy. 
United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128, 139 n. 13. Because exclusion 
of evidence is a necessary consequence of an Article I section 14 
violation under Larocco, the Scott rule, limiting the relevance of 
the officer's subjective intent to the exclusion question, does not 
apply. 
In sum, because the State failed to meet its burden to show 
that a reasonable hypothetical officer would have arrested Ms. 
Harmon absent Detective Russo's illegal motivation, all evidence 
derived from the warrantless arrest must be excluded. See State v. 
Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Utah App. 1992)(the State carries the 
ultimate burden of proof in pretext cases). 
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II. 
THE STATE DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN TO SHOW 
THAT MS. HARMON'S CONSENT WAS VOLUNTARY AND 
PURGED OF THE TAINT OF THE ILLEGAL ARREST. 
The State's burden in attempting to justify warrantless 
searches and seizures with consent is described in State v. Robinson 
and Towers. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), as follows: 
Two factors determine whether consent to a search 
is lawfully obtained following police action that 
violates the fourth amendment, such as the 
unlawful detention here: (1) the consent must be 
voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not 
be obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality. Both tests must be met in order for 
evidence obtained in searches following police 
illegality to be admissible. 
Whether a consent to a search was in fact 
voluntary 
or was the product of duress or 
coercion, express or implied, is a 
question of fact to be determined from 
the totality of all the circumstances. 
While knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent is one factor to be taken into 
account, the government need not 
establish such knowledge as the sine 
qua non of an effective consent. 
In examining all the surrounding 
circumstances to determine if in fact the 
consent to search was coerced, a court must 
take into account both the details of police 
conduct and the characteristics of the 
accused, which include "subtly coercive 
police questions, as well as the possibly 
vulnerable subjective state of the person 
who consents." It is the State's burden to 
prove that a consent to search was 
voluntary* 
.... 
As the Utah Supreme Court recently 
stressed, a prosecutor attempting to prove 
voluntary consent after illegal police 
action "'has a much heavier burden to 
satisfy than when proving consent to search7 
which does not follow police misconduct. 
797 P.2d at 437 and n.7 (citations omitted). 
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Because the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that 
Ms. Harmon's arrest was illegal, the trial court did not assess 
whether the State met its burden to show that Ms. Harmon's consent 
was not only voluntary, but also was purged of the taint of the 
illegal arrest. 
A. THE CONSENT WAS TAINTED BY THE ILLEGAL ARREST. 
This Court has recognized that consents that appear to be 
wholly voluntary are nonetheless inadequate to justify warrantless 
searches if the consents are not sufficiently attenuated from 
preceding police illegalities. E.g. State v. Small, 829 P.2d 129, 
132 (Utah App. 1992)(addressing the issue in original appellate 
findings, this Court found no evidence that the consent was 
involuntary, but reversed denial of suppression ruling because 
consent was tainted by illegal roadblock). In fact, this Court need 
not even address whether the search was voluntary if this Court 
agrees that the State has failed to demonstrate that the consent was 
purged of the taint of the illegal stop and detention. State v. 
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 656 (Utah App. 1992). 
As the court explained in State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 
(Utah 1990), 
The basis for the second part of the 
two-part analysis is found in the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun v. United 
States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963), which stated that a 
trial court must determine in such a case 
•"whether, granting establishment of the primary 
illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead of 
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means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged 
of the primary taint.'" 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting 
Maguire# Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959). The 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has been 
extended to invalidate consents which, despite 
being voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation 
of a prior police illegality. 
Id. at 690. 
The court further explained the factors to be considered in 
determining whether the State has met its burden of demonstrating 
that the consent was not tainted by preceding illegality: whether 
warnings of rights were given, the temporal proximity of the 
illegality and the consent, intervening circumstances,7 and the 
purpose and flagracy of the illegality. Id. at 690-691 n.4. 
The pertinent facts and circumstances demonstrate that the 
State cannot meet its burden of proving that the consent was 
separate from, rather than a product of and/or tainted by the 
preceding illegalities. The encounter between Ms. Harmon and 
Detective Russo began in the evening, when he drove up to her house 
in an unmarked car, identified himself as a police officer, and 
accused her of being a rumored "drug lord" and of having "all the 
drugs in Columbia" in her house. She did not consent to the search 
of her home at that time. 
When Ms. Harmon next encountered the detective, she was 
stopped in a parking lot by three separate police cars, frisked and 
7. For examples of intervening circumstances, see e.g. 
Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)(the defendant 
was allowed to consult with his companion in his car); Reves v. 
State, 741 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)(the defendant was 
admonished that his consent was not mandated). 
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handcuffed. Detective Russo found incriminating evidence — 
prescription drugs belonging to other people, and a prescription 
bottle with the label scratched off in her purse. 
When she was arrested, Ms. Harmon was crying, and again 
informed Detective Russo that he could not search her home without a 
warrant. 
Russo confiscated her bail money and began driving her 
alone with him in his unmarked car to the jail. While he 
purportedly was arresting her for driving on suspension, he told her 
on the way to the jail that he knew she had drugs, and that it would 
be unpleasant if he had to get a warrant. After driving some 70 or 
90 blocks with him, Julie Harmon finally agreed that he could search 
her home. When they arrived there, Detective Russo had her sign the 
nonsensical consent form, a copy of which is in Appendix 3 to this 
brief. During this time, Ms. Harmon was concerned about the stress 
that her arrest would place on her father, who had just returned 
from the hospital, having suffered a heart attack. Detective Russo 
told her that it would be unpleasant if he had to get a warrant, and 
mentioned the possibility that her dog would be shot, allowing her 
to precede the police into her home to secure the dog. 
While Russo steadfastly denied that he bargained with Ms. 
Harmon for her consent to the search in exchange for his not taking 
her to jail for driving on suspension, the record demonstrates that 
once Russo obtained the consent that she had previously denied him 
twice, he did not take her to jail, or even cite her for driving on 
suspension. 
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Ms. Harmon's consent was inextricably intertwined with the 
illegal arrest. 
B. THE CONSENT WAS NOT VOLUNTARY. 
To show voluntary consent, the State must carry this burden 
of proof: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony 
that the consent was "unequivocal and specific11 
and "freely and intelligently given11; 
(2) the government must prove consent was given 
without duress or coercion, express or implied; 
and 
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be 
convincing evidence that such rights were waived. 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990)(citations omitted). 
Ms. Harmon's consent cannot be considered clear and 
specific, inasmuch as it is memorialized in the garbled consent form 
in Appendix 3. 
More importantly, the consent cannot be considered freely 
given, for it was a product of coercion and duress. A lack of 
coercion may be shown by the following: 
1) absence of a claim of authority to search by 
the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of 
force by the officers; 3) a mere request to 
search; 4) cooperation by the owner ...; and 5) 
the absence of deception or trick on the part of 
the officer. 
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 
Here, Detective Russo at least twice mentioned that he 
would have to get a warrant if Ms. Harmon would not consent, despite 
the fact that he knew he could obtain no such warrant. Rather than 
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honestly telling Ms. Harmon that he could not obtain a warrant, or 
simply refraining from mentioning a warrant, Russo implied that he 
could obtain a warrant. Russo was very forceful, and Ms. Harmon was 
especially susceptible to his force. It was Russo who first 
mentioned the possibility that the police might shoot Ms. Harmon's 
dog during the course of the search, and the State presented no 
evidence disputing Ms. Harmon's testimony that she was under strain 
because her father had just returned home from the hospital 
following a heart attack. Inasmuch as Ms. Harmon's brother is a 
deputy sheriff, it is safe to assume that the State could easily 
have presented any evidence to impeach her on the strain she was 
suffering from this family circumstance, had such evidence existed. 
In his purported zeal to enforce the traffic code prohibiting 
driving on suspension as a class C misdemeanor, Russo summoned two 
additional police cars containing at least three other officers, to 
surround Ms. Harmon's car. He handcuffed her, frisked her, went 
through her purse, confiscated her bail money and apparently illegal 
prescription drugs, informed her of her Miranda rights, and put her 
in the police car. Shortly thereafter, on the way to the jail, 
rather than discussing the evils of driving on suspension, he again 
informed her that he knew she had drugs in her home, and warned her 
that it would be unpleasant if he had to get a warrant. At the time 
he made these statements, Ms. Harmon had refused to consent to the 
search of her home at least twice. While Russo contradicted Ms. 
Harmon's testimony that her consent to search was exchanged for his 
promise to take her home and not to the jail, the facts on the 
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record remain. Once Russo obtained without a warrant during the 
"search and seizure arrest" the evidence against the rumored drug 
lord (although perhaps a bit less than all the drugs in Columbia), 
he did not incarcerate or even cite Ms. Harmon for driving on 
suspension. 
These facts demonstrate far less freedom and far more 
coercion than existed in State v. Robinson and Towers. 797 P.2d 431 
(Utah App. 1990), in which this Court determined for the first time 
on appeal that the consent given was not voluntary, stating, 
Here, the defendants were first questioned 
about their right to possession of the van during 
the brief, initially valid traffic stop. Once 
the legal basis for that stop had ended, after a 
short period of detention, they were nonetheless 
not free to leave. They were detained and 
questioned about matters other than the traffic 
violation on the side of the interstate by two 
armed police officers with apparent, though 
false, authority to do so, then ordered by one 
trooper to remain at the van and await his 
return. They complied with his commands. Next, 
they were questioned about whether they were 
carrying any contraband and asked to consent to a 
search of the vehicle. There is no evidence that 
Robinson was aware or was informed that he did 
not have to accede to the trooper's request. At 
that time, it was apparent that the defendants 
would be kept in that custodial environment until 
the troopers satisfied their curiosity about the 
contents of the van, particularly the area under 
the bed. In light of the troopers' questioning 
and conduct, the coercive atmosphere at the time, 
and the other surrounding circumstances, we 
conclude that the State has not borne its burden 
of proving that Robinson's consent to search the 
vehicle was voluntary. 
Id. at 10. 
In short, in this case, as in Robinson and Towers, the 
prosecution did not meet its burden of proving voluntary consent. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Ms. 
Harmon's motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of Dec, 1992. 
MARtf R." MOFF$F 
Attorney forLMs. Harmon 
mwA 
?LlZABfcyHli^ )I]6Rt)0K 
Attorney far Ms. Harmon 
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APPENDIX 1 
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I# Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden-
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among 
the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
when the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and 
Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of 
the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one 
years of age, and citizens of the United States, 
or in any way abridged, except for participation 
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or 
Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or 
under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer 
of the United States, or as a member of any State 
legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution 
of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same or 
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each 
House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the 
United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or 
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation 
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
Utah Code Ann. section 41-2-136 (1992 Cum. Supp.) provides: 
41-2-136. Operating vehicle prohibited while 
license denied, suspended, disqualified, or 
revoked—Penalties• 
(1) A person whose license has been denied, 
suspended, disqualified, or revoked under this 
chapter or under the laws of the state in which 
his license was issued and who operates any motor 
vehicle upon the highways of this state while 
that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, 
or revoked shall be punished as provided in this 
section. 
(2) A person convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (1), other than a violation specified 
in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class C 
misdemeanor. 
(3) (a) A person is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor whose conviction under 
Subsection (1) is based on his operating a 
vehicle while his license is suspended, 
disqualified, or revoked for: 
(i) a refusal to submit to a 
chemical test under Section 41-6-44.10; 
(ii) a violation of Section 
41-6-44; 
(iii) a violation of a local 
ordinance that complies with the 
requirements of Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) a violation of Section 
76-5-207; 
(v) a criminal action that the 
person plead guilty to as a result of a 
plea bargain after having been 
originally charged with violating one 
or more of the sections or ordinances 
under this subsection; 
(vi) a revocation or suspension 
which has been extended under 
Subsection 41-2-127(2); or 
(vii) where disqualification is 
the result of driving a commercial 
motor vehicle while the person's CDL is 
disqualified, suspended, canceled, or 
revoked under Subsection 41-2-715(1). 
(b) A person is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor whose conviction under 
Subsection (1) is based upon his operating a 
vehicle while his license is suspended, 
disqualified, or revoked in his state of 
licensure for violations corresponding to 
the violations listed in Subsection (a). 
(c) A fine imposed under this 
subsection shall be at least the maximum 
fine for a class C misdemeanor under Section 
76-3-301. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-2 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides: 
77-7-2. By peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under 
authority of a warrant or may, without warrant, 
arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or 
attempted in the presence of any peace 
officer; "presence" includes all of the 
physical senses or any device that enhances 
the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any 
physical sense, or records the observations 
of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has a reasonable cause to 
believe a felony has been committed and has 
reasonable cause to believe that the person 
arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to 
believe the person has committed a public 
offense, and there is reasonable cause for 
believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to 
avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of 
the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or 
damage property belonging to another 
person. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-18 (1992 Cum. Supp.) provides: 
77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor or infraction 
charge. 
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person 
into custody, or any public official of any 
county or municipality charged with the 
enforcement of the law, may issue and deliver a 
citation requiring any person subject to arrest 
or prosecution on a misdemeanor or infraction 
charge to appear at the court of the magistrate 
before whom the person should be taken pursuant 
to law if the person had been arrested. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JULIE HARMON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 921900308 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant 
to defendant Julie Harmon's Motion to Suppress various evidence 
obtained by the prosecution. Specifically, defendant seeks to 
suppress incriminating statements she made to an arresting 
police officer and illegal drugs that were discovered in a 
search of her residence on November 19, 1991. Based upon 
defendant's motion, the memoranda of both parties, the evidence 
at the suppression hearing, the arguments of counsel, and for 
good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters the following 
ruling. 
Defendant Harmon claims she was illegally stopped on a 
pretext by a police officer in Salt Lake County in violation of 
her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches 
p ft p *? n 
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and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. Harmon also alleges that Detective 
Russo illegally obtained her written consent to search her home 
by placing her under duress. Based on these two alleged 
violations, Harmon seeks to suppress any evidence obtained 
following her arrest and the subsequent search of her home. 
The underlying facts relevant to this motion are that on or 
about November 19, 1991, Detective Robbie Russo, a deputy 
county sheriff with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office on 
assignment to the Metro Narcotics Task Force, received a 
telephone tip from an informant that Julie Harmon was 
distributing narcotics at a single family dwelling located at 
2904 South 9100 West in Salt Lake County. At approximately 
6:00 p.m. that evening, Detective Russo went to that address to 
conduct a "knock and talk," which means that the officer went to 
1
 Harmon argues that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution should be interpreted more restrictively than the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but the 
Court is not persuaded by this view under the facts presented 
in this case. 
n r\ A r n 
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the address with the intention to walk up to the door, knock 
and ask for information to confirm or rebut the allegations in 
the telephone complaint. 
When Detective Russo arrived at the residence, he observed 
a person he later identified as Julie Harmon was in her car 
beginning to back out of the driveway of the residence. 
Detective Russo approached Harmon, told her he had received a 
complaint that she was distributing narcotics and asked if he 
could search her house. She refused, stating that her father, 
who had recently suffered a heart attack, was due to return 
home from the hospital and that she was on her way to visit 
him. According to Detective Russo, she then told Russo twice 
that he could search her home when she returned. At the 
suppression hearing, however, Harmon disputed this testimony. 
Following this conversation, Harmon drove to her parent's 
home. Detective Russo, sitting in his patrol car in front of 
the house, called to check on Harmon's driver's license and was 
informed that her license was suspended. Shortly thereafter, 
Harmon returned to her home and drove around the block two 
times, evidently to observe what Detective Russo was doing. 
Detective Russo called in a marked patrol car to assist him in 
r r\ f\ r -? 
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stopping her for driving on a suspended license. Detective 
Russo and a uniformed police officer then stopped Harmon in a 
parking lot near her home. Harmon was placed under arrest for 
driving on a suspension. Detective Russo placed her in his 
unmarked vehicle, read Harmon her Miranda rights and proceeded 
to take her to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
According to Detective Russo, on the way to the jail, 
post-Miranda, Harmon admitted to Detective Russo that she had 
been afraid to let him into her residence because at one time 
she had sold drugs and the house contained drug paraphernalia, 
but that she was trying to clean up her act. According to 
Detective Russo, Harmon told him that if he drove her back to 
her house, she would let him in so that he could retrieve those 
items. According to Detective Russo, Harmon said she would 
sign a consent form to search her house. Detective Russo 
testified that he did not promise her any benefit for 
permitting a search of her home, and that she would still 
probably go to jail anyway. According to Detective Russo, 
Harmon again told Detective Russo she would consent to the 
search of her home and at that point Detective Russo turned his 
car around and drove back to Harmon's house. On the way, he 
called in for assistance to search her home. Upon arriving 
p r\ n r o 
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back at Harmon's home and before exiting the vehicle, Harmon 
was Mirandized again and she then signed a written consent to 
search her home. 
Having obtained Harmon's written consent to search, 
Detective Russo, together with some uniformed officers who had 
arrived on the scene, then proceeded inside, at which time 
Harmon pulled various items of drug paraphernalia and illegal 
2 
drugs out from underneath a sofa in the living room. During 
the search of the home, Harmon was permitted to telephone her 
brother, who she testified is himself a police officer and who 
was then at her parent's home. This call was made by Harmon to 
seek her brother's advice about what she should do under the 
circumstances. 
Defendant Harmon's contention is that the traffic stop was 
made under the pretext of a lawful stop, but that the real 
reason for stopping her was to obtain her consent to search her 
house through coercive means. Based upon this premise, Harmon 
argues that Russo's actions amounted to an unlawful "pretext 
stop." 
2 Thedrugs were subsequently identified as marijuana 
and methamphetamines. Additional testimony was presented 
pertaining to other controlled substances in the possession of 
Harmon at the time of her arrest, but the Court has not 
considered them in the context of this motion to suppress. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals recently clarified what 
constitutes a "pretext stop" in the state of Utah in State of 
Utah v. Lopez, P.2d (Utah App. Decided May 5, 1992). 
Lopez reiterates the well-established principal that under the 
Fourth Amendment, the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures extends to automobiles. Id,, at 3. 
"Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from 
randomly or arbitrarily stopping vehicles on the highway." 
Id. Lopez then describes three situations in which an officer 
is justified in stopping a vehicle without a warrant: 
(1) When the officer observes the driver commit 
a traffic violation; (2) When the officer has a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver 
is committing a traffic offense, such as driving 
under the influence of alcohol or driving without 
a license; and (3) When the officer has a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver 
is engaged in more serious criminal activity, 
such as transporting drugs. 
Id., at 4, [citations ommitted]. 
Lopez articulates that the "pretext doctrine" applies in 
two distinct situations. First, it applies where the facts 
demonstrate the driver did not commit a traffic violation. 
Under such circumstances, the stop would almost always be 
r r\ A o A 
STATE V. HARMON PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
unconstitutional. This situation does nut. exist in this case 
because it is undisputed that a traffic violation was committed 
by Harmon. Lopez, supra, at 6, Fn.7. The second situation is 
[w]here the driver committed a minor traffic 
violation or the vehicle had a minor equipment 
problem, but where the court concludes that a 
reasonable police officer [could have but] would 
not have stopped the vehicle absent the 
unconstitutional motivation. 
Id,, at 6 [emphasis added]. 
Lopez goes on to explain that 
[t]he proper inquiry is whether a reasonable 
officer would have stopped the defendant solely 
for commission of the traffic offense. . . . The 
proper inquiry does not focus on whether the 
officer could validly have made the stop. . . . 
Further. . . the officer's subjective motivation 
is not the relevant inquiry. 
Id.. at 9-10 [emphasis in original]. 
In the instant case, Harmon was stopped due to a traffic 
violation: namely, driving with a suspended license. Until 
Detective Russo learned that Harmon had a suspended license, he 
made no effort to stop her; and in fact, Harmon drove away from 
him. Detective Russo certainly was authorized to enforce the 
law to stop someone known by him to be driving on a suspended 
license. Moreover, driving on a suspended license is a Class B 
Misdemeanor in the State of Utah, and Detective Russo testified 
that he himself within the last year had made approximately 12 
C r> 0 o 
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stops for driving on a suspended license. The mere fact that 
Russo was assigned to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force instead 
of performing traffic duty does not render him less authorized 
to intervene if he has knowledge that someone is driving on a 
suspended license. It is the opinion of this Court, therefore, 
that a reasonable officer would have stopped Harmon for driving 
on a suspended license. 
The second issue raised by Harmon in relation to this stop 
is that it was not reasonable for Detective Russo to arrest her 
for this offense. As to this issue, Detective Russo had 
discretion whether to cite Harmon for this traffic violation or 
to arrest her. The testimony at the hearing was that officers 
in the field occasionally arrest persons driving on a suspended 
license, even if the driver does not appear to be intoxicated. 
They routinely exercise discretion as to whether they arrest 
the offender or merely issue a citation. This discretion 
exists in a multitude of situations in which an individual may 
be subject to arrest, bu the officer decides not to take that 
action. This discretion, which is inherent in the work of 
police officers, will not be disturbed in this case in light of 
all of the circumstances. Moreover, it does not appear to this 
Court that Detective Russo abused this discretion. 
roo 
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Thus, it appears tu t h J .•> Court I ha t i reasmaL lu officer 
would have stopped and arrested this defendant; and, therefore, 
Detective Russo's actions were not based upon a pretextual 
scheme, but upon his legal authority fc stop Harmon from 
committing a Class R Misdemeanor: namely, driving with a 
suspended license. Harmon's incriminating statements were, 
therefore, not illegally obtained; and Harmon's motion to 
suppress her statements is therefore denied. 
With regard to the evidence of drug paraphernalia, drugs 
and additional incriminating statements made by Harmon during 
the search of her home, the issue is whether this evidence was 
obtained through an unconstitutional search. Harmon claims her 
consent to this warrantless search is invalid because it was 
obtained under duress. 
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed the requirements for 
obtaining a voluntary consent in State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 
(Utah App. 1990) . Specifically, Bobo held that the 
•• [voluntariness of consent must be decided after consideration 
of the totality of the circumstances.11 Id. , at 1273 [quoting 
State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980]. The 
factors to be weighed in determining the voluntariness of a 
consent to search are as follows: 
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(1) the absence of a claim of authority to search 
by the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition 
of force by the officers; (3) a mere request to 
search; (4) cooperation by the owner. . . and (5) 
the absence of deception or trick on the part of 
the officer(s). 
Id*. 
Moreover, "[c]onsent while in custody does notf per se, 
render the consent involuntary. It is but a single element for 
the trial court to consider." Id.. at 1273-4. 
In this case, Harmon testified that Detective Russo told 
her he would have to shoot her dog if it attacked the officers 
and that this statement caused her to feel under duress prior 
to her signing the written consent. Detective Russo testified 
that all discussions concerning the dog occurred after Harmon 
signed the written consent to search. The Court is inclined to 
believe Detective Russo's testimony over that of Harmon's. 
First, Harmon appeared to be very evasive as a witness and not 
credible on this point. Second, she was, in fact, permitted to 
go into the house alone after giving her consent to take the 
dog out into the back yard. Finally, the dog was never 
jeopardized by the search by the officers. 
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Harmon's other argument why she \ lid not give her written 
consent voluntarily is that because her father had just been 
released from the hospital, she felt pressure not to reveal her 
arrest to him and other family member'-;. However, she also 
testified that prior to being stopped and arrested, she had 
qi ne 1 L » he i parent's home where her mother was cooking dinner 
and learned that her father had gone for i visit to the 
countryside. These facts do not support Harmon's claim that 
she was under particular duress because of any health problem 
on the part of her father at the time of signing the written 
consent form. Certainly it is not unusual for someone to be 
apprehensive that family members will be upset to learn of that 
person's arrest and pending criminal charges. In light of the 
totality of the circumstances in this case, the Court is not 
persuaded that Harmon was in particular distress such that she 
could not voluntarily sign the written consent to this search. 
It further appears to the Court that Detective Russo acted 
appropriately in obtaining Harmon's oral and written consent. 
He testified he had informed Harmon multiple times that he was 
not authorized to search her house without her consent and that 
if she would not consent, he would have tu obtain a warrant 
before he could search. 
COOSd 
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Further, Russo made no exhibition of force. Although 
Harmon was arrested for committing a Class B Misdemeanor, the 
arrest was made subsequent to an open violation of the traffic 
laws and, as such, it does not constitute a show of force 
within the meaning of the guidelines set forth under Bobo, 
supra. 
Further, Russo's testimony shows he merely made requests to 
search and that Harmon understood Russo could not search 
without her permission in the absence of a warrant. Indeed, 
Harmon refused to consent to a search when Detective Russo 
arrived at her home for the "knock and talk" and was permitted 
to leave when she refused. 
Finally, Detective Russo employed no deception or tricks 
to induce her consent. Harmon understood Russo would need 
either her consent or a warrant to search her home. Russo 
indicated nothing more than that he would have to apply for a 
warrant. He made no representations that he would most likely 
be granted a warrant. Further, Russo had Mirandized Harmon on 
two separate occasions: the final occasion being just before 
Harmon signed the consent form. 
All these actions clearly show that Russo did nothing to 
limit Harmon's freedom of choice to give consent. At the time 
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consent was obtained, Harmon had been stopped for driving with 
a suspended license and was enroute to jail pursuant to a 
lawful stop and subsequent search which indicated that she had 
possession of controlled substances on hei: person. No 
deception or coercion was employed to obtain consent, and 
Harmon was not under duress or acting involuntarily when she 
gave consent. Thus, her motion to suppress due to allegedly 
unconstitutional conduct by Russo is denied. 
Counsel for the State is to prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and an Order consistent with this ruli.m.3. 
Dated this <&^V dav of June, 1992. 
ANNE M. STIRBA^ -Jt-—.. .. 7 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE/"V^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JULIE HARMON 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 921900308 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
This matter having come before this Court pursuant to the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress and the Court having read the 
briefs submitted by the parties, having heard the testimony of the 
witnesses and arguments of counsel and having issued its 
Memorandum Decision dated June 3, 1991, the Court now hereby makes 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about November 19, 1992, Detective Russo, a 
Deputy Sheriff on the Metro Narcotics Task Force, received a 
telephone tip from an informant that Julie Harmon was distributing 
narcotics at a single family dwelling located at 2904 South 9100 
West in Salt Lake County. 
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2. At approximately 6:00 p.m., that evening, Detective 
Russo went to the address with the intention to walk up to the 
door, knock and ask for information to confirm or rebut the 
allegations in the telephone tip. 
3. When Detective Russo arrived at the residence, he 
observed Harmon in her car beginning to back out of the driveway 
of the residence* Detective Russo approached defendant Harmon, 
identified himself, told her he had received a complaint that she 
was distributing narcotics and asked if he could search her house. 
4. Harmon refused to let Detective Russo search her house, 
stating that her father had recently suffered a heart attack and 
was due to return home from the hospital and she was on her way to 
visit him. 
5. Harmon then drove away in her car. 
6. Detective Russo stayed outside Defendant's residence 
and called to check on Harmon's driver's license. He was informed 
that her license was suspended. Harmon returned home and drove 
around the block two times. 
7. Detective Russo saw defendant drive by twice and asked 
a marked patrol unit to assist him in stopping the defendant for 
driving on a suspended license. Detective Russo and the uniformed 
police officer then stopped Harmon in a parking lot near her home. 
8. Harmon was placed under arrest for Driving on 
Suspension. Detective Russo conducted a search incident to the 
arrest and found a controlled substance on her person. 
9. Detective Russo had stopped and arrested approximately 
12 persons for driving on a suspended license within the past year. 
10. Officers routinely excercise discretion as to whether 
they arrest for Driving on Suspension or issue a citation. 
11. On the way to jail, post Miranda H uimon admitted to 
Detective Russo that she had been afraid to let him into her 
residence because, at one time, she had sold drugs and the house 
contained drug paraphernalia. 
12. Harmon told Detective Russo that if he drove her back 
to her house, she would let him in so that he could retrieve those 
items. Harmon said she would sign a consent torm to search her 
house. Detective Russo did not promise Harmon any benefit for 
permitting i i .edich I hei hi »i use and stated that Harmon would 
probably go to jail anyway. Harmon again told Detective Russo she 
would consent to the search of her house and Detective Russo 
turned the car around and diave back ih Harmon's house. On the 
way back, he called for assistance to search Harmon's house. 
13. Upon arriving at Harmon's house and before exiting the 
vehicle, Harmon was Mirandized again and she then signed a written 
consent to search her house. 
14. After signing the consent form, Detective Russo told 
Defendant he would have to shoot her doq if it attached the 
officers. 
15. Harmon was permitted to go into the house alone to take 
the dog out into the back yard. The dog was never jeopardized in 
the search by the officers. 
16. Detective Russo and some uniformed officers who had 
arrived at the scene, proceeded inside the house. Harmon pulled 
various items of drug paraphernalia and illegal drugs out from 
underneath a sofa in the living room. 
17. During the search of the defendant's home, the 
defendant was permitted to telephone her brother, who was a police 
officer, to seek his advice about what she should do under the 
circumstances. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1* Detective Russo, having obtained information that 
Harmon's driver's license was suspended, properly stopped Harmon 
after he observed her driving. 
2. An objective reasonable officer would have stopped 
Harmon for driving on a suspended license. 
3. Police officers exercise discretion as to whether they 
arrest the offender or issue a citation. This discretion was not 
abused by Detective Russo when he arrested Harmon for Driving on 
Suspension. 
4. Hamons's arrest was made subsequent to an open 
violation of the traffic laws and it does not constitute a show of 
force within the meaning of the guidelines set forth in State v. 
Bobo, 803 P2d 1268 (UT App. 1990). 
5. Harmons's incriminating statements were made after 
Detective Russo Mirandized her and were not illegally obtained. 
6. No deception or coercion was used by Detective Russo to 
obtain Harmons' consent to search her house. Harmons' consent to 
search her house was freely and vonluntarily given, therefore 
Deputy Russo acted appropriately in obtaining Harmon's ora^and 
7. The facts in this case do not persuade the Court that a 
different analysis should be used under Article 1, Section 14, of 
the Utah Constitution. 
8. The search of Harmon's house was a legal search. 
DATED t h i s ? ^ day ol n t° 1992. 
< * 
approved ^irl'i'o form 
MARK R. MOFFAT 
A t t o r n e y f o r t h e Defendant 
BY THE COURT: 
r-nmp, 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RICHARD G. HAMP, Bar No. 4048 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, Room S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
:iLcU IN CLERK S OffiCl 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JUN 2 6 1992 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JULIE HARMON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 921900308 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, it is therefore ordered that: 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. 
DATED this ^ A ^ d a y of S=A^fc2^, 1992 
approved as to form 
MARK R. MOFFAT 
Attorney for the Defendant 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba /\^.--rN 
District Court Judge 
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frPPFNPIX 3 
Consent form 
&*** 
Metro Narcotics Strike Force 
IMETROPOLfTAN HAU OF.JUSTICE 
\ 315 EAST 200 SOUTH 
\ SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 . 
\ (801) 799-3672 
CONSENT TO SEARCH AUTHORIZATION 
Date. /"SO IS If n ^ / 
Add. Location: G^t^7 "^ //&& °**'ko*.. /Suite No, 
/isl^jA^A , Utah Y"/Q * K 
yi/lOAS , having been informed 
(Print) 
of my rights per Miranda not to have a search made of the premises, 
hereinafter mentioned, without a Search Warrant, of my right to 
refuse to consent to such a search, hereby authorize; 
P^ f R A v$SO police officer and his agent 
of the Metropolitan Narcotics Strike Force to conduct a complete 
search of my person, premise(s) and/or vehicle at; 
These officers are authorized by me to search and seize any 
contraband or fruits of any crime while conducting a search on a 
narcotics investigation. 
This written permission is being giver, to me to the above 
mentioned police officer voluntarily and without threats or 
promises of any kind. 
Signature 
WitnessedJyj 
( N a m e ) / 
of nn*-i£4 Add. 
(Name) 
o f 
Add. 
^ / ? C 5 
. Utah 
., Utah 
EXHI3IT 1 
